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What are the leading forces and ideas that are shaping our age? In the West, a decade of financial 
disruption, austerity, and stagnant wages has produced a popular rejection of market 
fundamentalism that prevailed for over forty years. Mass immigration and multiculturalism have 
contributed to rapid changes in both family and community life that leave many people feeling 
dispossessed or even humiliated. Unresponsive government is exacerbating peopleÕs sense of 
powerlessness and anger. The revolt against the status quo is fuelling a political insurgency against 
the establishment that replaces the old opposition of left versus right with a similarly simplistic 
dichotomy pitting the people against the elites. We are witnessing the failure of dualistic thinking 
and this will not be resolved by substituting one binary for another. 
 
The populism of the far left and the radical right thrives on economic and cultural insecurity as both 
the working classes and the lower middle class experience permanently lower living standards and 
the loss of their ways of life. Populist politics is an emotional expression of identities under threat 
that trumps rational concerns for material progress. While the motivating energy of populists is the 
need to redeem a sense of inherited popular culture against the elite culture of the professional class, 
it is also the case that contemporary populism invents identity: it equates the people as they are in 
their families and communities with RousseauÕs volont gnrale Ð the monolithic will of ÔThe 
PeopleÕ embodied by a self-proclaimed leader who promises simple solutions. Populists are just as 
guilty of manipulation and demagogy as the establishment. Both polarize politics just when 
democracy needs a transcendent conversation about the pre-political ÔweÕ Ð the social, civic ties 
binding us together as citizens who jointly inhabit neighbourhoods and nations. Beyond economic 
or cultural tribes, there are also bonds of shared belonging. What is missing in our age is a public 




The first task in crafting such a public philosophy is to conceptualize the times we are living in. 
Antonio Gramsci calls this an analysis of the Ôconjuncture,Õ which he defines as the events, social 
factors, and economic interests that shape society at any given moment in its history.1 A political 
settlement emerges when these forces broadly align. Since the conjuncture is in flux, each political 
settlement is not fixed and it is only dominant if it converges with what Gramsci calls the 
Ôsituation,Õ which he defines as deeper organic trends and historical forces that structure the 
foundations of society Ð moral, cultural and social issues as well as class interests.2 Gramsci calls 
such a convergence between conjuncture and situation ÔhegemonyÕ: political domination beyond the 
state and the market into the realm of culture and society. At any moment rival political forces 
contest the meaning of the dominant settlement in what Gramsci calls a Ôwar of movement.Õ Once a 
settlement is no longer hegemonic and in crisis, politics enters an ÔinterregnumÕ when the political 
contest shifts to a Ôwar of positionÕ that is a battle over ideas, common sense, organization, and 
leadership. 
 
Our contemporary conjuncture is such a period of interregnum and a war of position between the 
hitherto hegemonic ideology of liberalism and its populist rivals. The popular revolt against 
liberalism, which is driving the political insurgency across the West, highlights the collapse of the 
authority of the professional political class dominated by liberals.3 In GramsciÕs words, ÒIf the 
ruling class has lost consensus, that is, if it no longer "leads" but only "rules" Ð it possesses sheer 
coercive power Ð this actually means that the great masses have become detached from traditional 
ideologies.Ó4 The breakdown of peopleÕs trust in mainstream politics points to a deeper crisis that 
reveals a divergence between the current conjuncture and the wider situation: ÒThe crisis consists 
                                                        
* I am indebted to conversations with Jon Cruddas, Maurice Glasman, Ron Ivy, John Milbank, James Noyes, and 
Jonathan Rutherford. 
1 Antonio Gramsci, ÔThe Third Notebook (1930)Õ, in Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. Joseph A. Buttigieg (New York: 
Columbia Press, 1996), Vol. 2. Here I draw on Jonathan RutherfordÕs several unpublished essays on Gramsci. 
2 Gramsci subscribes to the Marxist idea that the ÔsituationÕ (or base) determines the ÔconjunctureÕ (or superstructure), 
but he accords much greater power and autonomy to ideas and culture than Marxist materialism. 
3 Peter Oborne, The Triumph of the Political Class (London: Simon & Schuster, 2007). 
4 Gramsci, ÔThe Third Notebook (1930)Õ, ¤34, p. 32. 
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precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum morbid 
phenomena of the most varied kind come to pass.Ó5 These morbid phenomena encompass the 
failure of liberalism and the limits of populism because, as I shall argue, both rest on an anti-
humanist logic. 
 
The anti-liberal insurgency has shaken liberals or even dislodged them from power, but it has not 
and likely will not defeat liberalism altogether. Gramsci suggests that the previously hegemonic 
forces try to resolve conjunctural contradictions within the limits defined by the political settlement: 
A crisis occurs, sometimes lasting for decades. This exceptional duration means that 
incurable structural contradictions have revealed themselves (reached maturity), and 
that despite this, the political forces which are struggling to conserve and defend the 
existing structure are making every effort to cure them, within certain limits, and to 
overcome them.6 
 
Faced with the loss of its hegemonic status, the professional political class led by liberals is 
desperately trying to contain the populist insurgency. But in a deliberate inversion of GramsciÕs 
argument, it is in reality the new that is dead and the old that is yet to be revitalized. The failure of 
liberalism means that we are witnessing the demise of the New Left, the New Right, and their 
convergence around the liberalisms that shaped the dominant political settlements in recent history: 
the Ôembedded liberalismÕ of the post-war consensus, the social liberalism since the 1960s and the 
economic liberalism since the 1980s.7 The death of the new marks the end of the liberal hegemony 
because the assumptions of liberalism defy the common sense of the people and liberals struggle to 
assemble a coalition of estranged groups through which it can lead rather than simply rule. 
 
In our times when the old consensus of the new is dead and a renewal of older traditions is yet to 
occur, the democratic contest is over which ideology can offer a Ônational popular politics.Õ Gramsci 
describes this rather vaguely as an alignment of popular aspirations with national culture. 
                                                        
5 Gramsci, ÔThe Third Notebook (1930)Õ, ¤34, pp. 32-33. 
6 Gramsci, ÔFourth Notebook (1930-1932),Õ ¤38, p. 177. 
7 John Milbank and Adrian Pabst, The Politics of Virtue: Post-liberalism and the Human Future (London: Rowman & 
Littlefield International, 2016), pp. 1-10 and 13-67. 
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Intellectuals Ð including politicians, party members and all those active in politics Ð play an 
important role of mediating guidance in bringing together people and the nation into a unified 
political form, something that he calls the Ôpeople-nation.Õ The task is to combine feeling with 
knowledge in ways that generate mutual understanding and avoid extremes: ÒThe popular element 
"feels" but does not always know or understand; the intellectual element "knows", but does not 
always understand and, above all, does not feel. The two extremes, therefore, are pedantry and 
philistinism on the one hand and blind passion and sectarianism on the other.Ó8 
 
To command majority support for a national popular politics requires a cultural change by the 
political class that reflects the common sense of the people rather than the opinions of elites. But the 
opposite is currently happening. The established traditions of liberalism, conservatism, and 
socialism, which were dominant for much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, are at odds 
with popular beliefs and values. The conservativesÕ reputation for being a competent reliable force 
in power lies in tatters and their model of free-market capitalism leads to a concentration of wealth 
for the few that violates a sense of justice. Social democrats and socialists have abandoned their 
traditional working-class supporters in favor of a largely urban, progressively minded electorate and 
their model of state-administered egalitarianism divides society. And everywhere the liberal 
obsession with the individualized identity of minority groups excludes a majority from mainstream 
politics. In their contemporary form, none of these traditions has much to say about what people 
share as members of national, cultural communities or even what binds them together as humans. 
 
In what follows I shall argue that the emergent ideologies which are vying for hegemony are hyper-
liberalism, nationalist traditionalism, and tech utopianism. All of them are variously anti-humanist, 
to which one can oppose updated versions of one-nation conservatism and ethical socialism. Before 
setting out the unfolding Ôwar of position,Õ I will first explore the new anti-humanism that underpins 
the main ideological movements. 
                                                        
8 Gramsci, ÔFourth Notebook (1930-1932),Õ ¤33, p. 173. 
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The surrender of the human 
 
As the British MP and political thinker Jon Cruddas has argued, the character of politics has shifted 
from a sense of sacrificial contribution to the common life based on the struggles of representative 
democracy and collective agency to a culture of victimhood, a movement politics of protest, and 
narcissistic online echo chambers of what we do and do not like.9 At the hands of the revolutionary 
left and the radical right, identity politics is now joining forces with technological determinism and 
anti-humanism that rest on the same logic of rejecting natural law, fetishizing transgression and 
embracing the nihilism of Ôdark enlightenmentÕ disguised as a liberating tech utopia.10 This marks 
the surrender of universal human nature, the dignity of the person, and with it the pursuit of the 
common good based on mutual flourishing and the building of a just society. 
 
Hating the liberal model of capitalist globalization, the resurgent extremes seek to institute an 
alternative modernity that is anti-liberal but in reality an intensification of certain modern liberal 
ideas: the cult of the individual, an invocation of the Ôwill of the people,Õ the unmediated power of 
techno-science, and a non-teleological cosmos in which both nature and humanity will be replaced 
Ð or, to use the ÔaccelerationistÕ language of deception, ÔenhancedÕ Ð by a new Promethean spirit.11 
Prometheanism combines a naturalist philosophy in which reality has no purpose with a materialist 
politics driven by economic and technological forces Ð a belief it shares with accelerationist 
Marxism.12 In the words of Ray Brassier, Òexistence is worthless [É] and nihilism is [...] the 
unavoidable corollary of the realist conviction that there is a mind-independent reality which [...] is 
                                                        
9 Jon Cruddas, ÔThe humanist left must challenge the rise of cyborg socialism,Õ The New Statesman, 20-26 April 2018, 
online at https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2018/04/humanist-left-must-challenge-rise-cyborg-socialism 
10 Nick Land, the father of ÔaccelerationismÕ that informs both left- and right-wing libertarians, set up the Cybernetic 
Culture Research Unit at Warwick University that incubated the cyber philosophy underpinning accelerationist ideas. 
See his book  The Thirst for Annihilation: Georges Bataille and Virulent Nihilism  (London: Routledge, 1992) and his 
2013 essay ÔThe Dark Enlightenment,Õ at http://www.thedarkenlightenment.com/the-dark-enlightenment-by-nick-land 
11 Ray Brassier, ÔPrometheanism and its Critics,Õ in Robin Mackaey and Armen Avenessian (eds.), #Accelerate: the 
Accelerationist Reader (Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2014), pp. 467-88. 
12 Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams, Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work (London: Verso, 
2015); Paul Mason, Postcapitalism. A Guide to our Future (London: Allen Lane, 2015); Aaron Bastani, Fully 
Automated Luxury Communism: A Manifesto (London: Verso, 2018), forthcoming. 
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indifferent to our existence and oblivious to the ÔvaluesÕ and ÔmeaningsÕ which we would drape 
over it in order to make it more hospitable.Ó13  
 
Just like PrometheusÕ theft of fire sought to subvert the power of the gods in an attempt to elevate 
humans from their supposed humiliation, so too the new Prometheanism seeks to remake humanity 
through the unmediated power of technology. The convergence of nanotech, biotech, infotech, and 
cognitive science serves to create a Ôplane of immanenceÕ (building on the immanentist ontology 
from Duns Scotus via Spinoza to Deleuze) that transcends our human condition in the direction of a 
new Ôsingularity,Õ which is grounded in a flat ontology of equivalence between all subjects that 
make up the Ômultitude.Õ14 The aim is to liberate the individual and the masses not simply from the 
trap of contemporary capitalism but above all from any limits of nature or history. Both the natural 
order and inherited traditions are seen as arbitrary, irrational boundaries on our free mind that 
artificially creates reality from nothing. In this manner, technologically enhanced humanity replaces 
the Creator God as the supernatural source of being. Instead of coming into existence ex nihilo, 
humans are now revealed to have a Ôwill to nothingness,Õ which paradoxically is the ultimate 
ground of everything. Transhumanism is a nihilism.  
 
By positing that human nature is in total flux, modern transhumanists from Julian Huxley (brother 
of Aldous) to Max More view the possibilities of science and technology as more fundamental than 
the actuality of life Ð to the point where everything from anti-ageing genetic research, robotics, AI, 
cybernetics, life extension, Ômind-uploading,Õ and cryonics ends up producing news forms of 
existence that engender ever-more advanced versions of themselves.15 This Ôsingularity momentÕ is 
portrayed as the new frontier of reason and science when in fact it constitutes the meeting point 
                                                        
13 Ray Brassier, Nihil Unbound. Enlightenment and Extinction (London: Palgrave, 2007), p. ix. 
14 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire (London: Penguin, 2005). 
15 Julian Huxley coined the term ÔtranshumanÕ in his 1951 essay that was subsequently published in a book of essays 
Knowledge, Morality and Destiny (New York: New American Library, 1960); Max More, ÔTranshumanism: Towards a 
Futurist PhilosophyÕ (1990) and ÔThe Philosophy of Transhumanism,Õ in Max More and Natasha Vita-More (eds.), The 
Transhumanist Reader: Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science, Technology, and Philosophy of the Human 
Future (Oxford: Wiley, 2013), pp. 3-17. 
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between Ônew ageÕ fanaticism and science fiction. ÔIf you love life, extend it into the vanishing ether 
of cyber-realityÕ seems to be the transhumanistsÕ oddly life-denying motto. 
 
The Promethean spirit promises to release us from our affections and attachments to relationships 
and institutions that make us more fully human as social, political beings. That is what Brassier 
means by Ônihil unbound.Õ Such a release is not the same as liberation from oppression and 
exploitation combined with a promotion of human self-government. Rather, Brassier and his fellow 
accelerationists have in mind what they call in their manifesto Òa Promethean politics of maximal 
mastery over societyÓ (¤21) that fuses Òthe command of The PlanÓ with Òthe improvised order of 
The NetworkÓ (¤14).16 Here libertarian freedom meets totalitarian control.  
 
This means not resisting or transforming capitalism but instead realizing the capitalist utopia of 
infinite possibility based on an ontology of immanence: Òexpansion beyond the limitations of the 
earth and our immediate bodily formsÓ (¤22) Ò[É] towards the universal possibilities of the 
OutsideÓ (¤24). Only accelerationism can fulfill the promise of the Enlightenment to Òshift beyond 
the world of minimal technical upgrades towards all encompassing changeÓ (¤22) because humanity 
and the universe are by nature deficient and therefore require technological completion. The 
individual, released from all constraints, can be whatever she wants. 
 
Based on a similarly Promethean anti-humanism, liberals have passed laws permitting euthanasia 
and sex changes for minors without parental agreement Ð as in Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Norway. To allow people to die as they wish or to change their gender is to subordinate the intrinsic 
value of human life in its givenness to individual freedom of choice and the pursuit of happiness, 
itself construed in utilitarian terms as maximizing pleasure and avoiding pain Ð not a richer sense of 
happiness that combines personal fulfilment with mutual flourishing. Such a conception would 
include the acceptance that live involves suffering and dying. Liberals who claim we have a right to 
                                                        
16  Alex Williams and Nick Srnicek, Ô#Accelerate: Manifesto for an Accelerationist Politics,Õ in Mackaey and 
Avenessian, #Accelerate: the Accelerationist Reader, pp. 347-62, quotes at ¤21, ¤14 and ¤22. 
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happiness abhor the thought of human frailty because it gets in the way of feeling good about 
yourself. This violates a universal ethical principle that has governed most cultures and societies in 
history Ð nature and human life have almost always been recognized as having a sacred dimension 
beyond the power of human volition. No person enjoys full sovereign jurisdiction over her own 
possession of life and her body. 
 
The dominant strands of liberalism redefine life as something that belongs to individuals as their 
own property. But even self-ownership requires protection by the state. Therefore liberalism 
effectively grants government power over life itself. That is why liberals have not hesitated to 
liberalise euthanasia. This hands over life to the forces of the state and the market, treating it as a 
commodity that can be traded or dispensed with without regard to its intrinsic worth. If this were 
true, then we would have to conclude that we really are isolated individuals, disembedded from 
relationships with other embodied beings and reducible to biological-chemical processes. To adopt 
this perspective is to abandon the entire basis of humanism. It is to replace the idea of dignity with 
private liberty and comfort, which are now the only constraints on individual choice. Paradoxically, 
liberalism promises liberation from any constraint not chosen by consenting individuals who have 
no obligation to anyone while at the same time being subordinate to the liberal world order based on 
an overweening state and the expanding global market.17 Yet behind the negatively self-choosing 
individual stands the state, which can either permit anti-humanism or, on the contrary, uphold 
principles in line with natural law that grant human existence a unique status and promote life over 
death. 
 
Liberal man is the freest man ever to have lived and at the same time the most domesticated Ð the 
richest and at the same time the most dispossessed. Really existing liberalism unleashes the forces 
of domestication and dispossession that include capitalism, statism, and globalization.18 They 
                                                        
17 Patrick J. Deneen, Why Liberalism Failed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018). 
18 Maurice Glasman, ÔA home in the world: Brexit and the future of British politics,Õ lecture at the University of Kent, 
31 January 2018. 
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involve the administration of people and nature as commodities circulating in an unmediated space 
and the oscillation between the individual Ð disembedded from history, institutions, and 
relationships Ð and the collective based upon a positivist legal system. This liberal order is 
inherently unstable and prone to periodic crises because liberalism erodes the very foundations on 
which it rests. It brings about economic injustice and divisions in society that are threatening the 
social contract between the people and their representatives, which is the bedrock of the liberal 
tradition since Hobbes and Locke. The elites fail to understand that the anti-establishment 




Faced with the political insurgency, liberals have so far not learned their lesson. Instead of drawing 
on older liberal traditions anchored in notions of social virtue, they have doubled down and 
embraced what John Gray calls hyper-liberalism.19 Far from defending toleration and a richer 
conception of freedom, hyper-liberal politics seeks to overcome any attachment to national and 
group identity in favor of a borderless world without restrictions on personal choice. Gone is a 
commitment to critical debate about rival values and beliefs, combined with a concern for truth. By 
contrast, hyper-liberals are at best indifferent to facts and at worst engage in sophistry with virtue-
signaling self-righteousness, condemning patriotism as reactionary and national identity as a 
repressive construction while promoting a cosmopolitan vision that is remote from the everyday 
existence of most people. 
 
As Gray argues, hyper-liberalism is less a departure from the main liberal tradition as an 
intensification of liberalism as a secular religion. With a blind faith in progress and individual 
emancipation from all forms of shared belonging, liberalism at the hands of J.S. Mill, who was 
                                                        
19 John Gray, ÔUn-liberty. Some problems with the new cult of hyper-liberalism,Õ The Times Literary Supplement, 30 
March 2018, online at https://www.the-tls.co.uk/articles/public/john-gray-hyper-liberalism-liberty/ 
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deeply influenced by the positivist philosophy of Auguste Comte,20 became a new religion of 
humanity that worships the human species as Ôthe new Supreme BeingÕ Ð a notion at the heart of 
RobespierreÕs politics of terror. By reducing freedom to the absence of constraints on individuals 
except for the law and private conscience, Mill and his followers in politics have replaced toleration 
with oppression: a notion of liberty synonymous with personal choice implies that identity is 
constructed by individual volition and can be undone in the name of the self without any regard for 
the relational constraints and opportunities of the family, community, nation and beyond.21 
 
Moreover, MillÕs secular religion of humanity ignores peopleÕs deep yearning for belonging and 
security rather than pure personal emancipation. The hyper-liberalism that has emerged in our times 
cannot comprehend that popular attachment and affections for relationships embedded in 
institutions of culture provide meaning. It equates such sentiments with atavistic prejudice that must 
be swept away in the name of progress embodied in transnational state power and the expanding 
global market. The rise of impersonal power promoted by hyper-liberals is a key driver for the 
political insurgency. Crucially, Ôthe new religion of humanityÕ flips over into an anti-humanist 
politics that enforces large-scale social engineering to refashion society in the image of hyper-
liberalism, combining free-market fundamentalism with social egalitarianism and liberal identity 
politics. 
 
As an ideology and a system of government, modern liberalism turns the market economy into a 
capitalist engine of commodification that turns human beings and nature into things that are subject 
to fluctuating prices as part of commodity exchange, which strips people and the natural habitat of all 
intrinsic worth, symbolic significance, and sacred character. Connected with the commodifying 
pressures of liberal capitalism is the slide into oligarchy. Far from defending open and competitive 
markets, liberalism maintains old monopolies and creates new cartels. This concerns the economy 
where the lack of democratic accountability is inversely related to the growing concentration of 
                                                        
20 Maurice Cowling, Mill and Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963). 
21 See again Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, pp. 1-10 and 13-67. 
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wealth and power. In 2017, two-thirds of the total number of sectors across developed economies 
were characterized by a greater concentration of ownership and control than in 1997, including old 
monopolistic industries such as tobacco, food, construction, retail, the car industry, and Wall 
Street.22 
 
The new cartels include the tech giants of Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and the 
Chinese conglomerate Alibaba, which are modern-day plutocracies with such dominant market 
positions that they can take over their online competitors and eat the traditional retail world. 
Oligarchic power undermines both economic competition and democracy. By managing access to 
information and knowledge, Facebook and Google exercise control over public debate in ways that 
threaten not just open markets but free speech and democratic argument. There is an online 
feedback loop optimized for manipulation: make money on Google, and then spend the proceeds on 
paid ads propaganda via Facebook. 
 
The liberal oligarchy, which can be found in different liberal democracies across the globe, takes 
the form of Ôold elitesÕ and Ônew classes,Õ as Paul Piccone and Christopher Lasch argued. The old 
elites include long-standing political dynasties and captains of industry, while the new classes 
encompass networks such as the Tech oligarchy in Silicon Valley,23 the advocates of Ôcapitalist 
philanthropy,Õ and an array of technocrats in governments. They all use the procedures of liberal 
democracy to increase their power, wealth, and social status while at the same disregarding the 
more informal manifestations of citizensÕ interests. 
 
This drift towards oligarchy also reveals how liberalism can be a catalyst for demagogy. Liberal 
indifference to substantive values of truth and goodness involves a tendency to exploit fear and 
manipulate opinion. Liberalism claims to offer security by guarding us against alien elements Ð the 
bigot, the racist, the welfare-scrounger and those deemed deficient in Ôentrepreneurship.Õ For 
                                                        
22 Barry C. Lynn, Cornered: The New Monopoly Capitalism and the Economics of Destruction (Hoboken: John Wiley, 
2010). 
23 Joel Kotkin, The New Class Conflict (New York: Telos, 2014). 
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liberals, human beings are rational, self-owning individuals who owe nothing to society Ð a form of 
possessive individualism first developed by Hobbes and Locke.24  
 
The liberal practice of oligarchy and demagogy ends up undermining the principles of liberality on 
which liberalism rests, including free inquiry, free speech, and tolerance. Liberal politics thereby 
produces the threats that it supposedly protects us from Ð ideological tyranny and the closing-down 
of argument. University Ôsafe spacesÕ and echo chambers on social media leave people unprepared 
to deal with views other than their own. The result is a political culture that is increasingly 
narcissistic and unable to build broad alliances. Paradoxically, liberalism brings about the kind of 
intolerant illiberalism that it ascribes to all non-liberal positions. 
 
The other element of hyper-liberalism is social egalitarianism and individualized identity politics 
embraced by both left and right. First the New Left from the mid-1960s onwards took socialism in a 
doctrinaire direction that was either rationalist-scientific or culturally liberationist but either way 
abstract and soulless. It preferred progress to tradition, identity to class, and free choice to 
inheritance or common purpose. Then the New Right combined a libertarian economics with a 
corporate capture of the state Ð aligning conservatism with borderless capitalism, fundamentalist 
faith, and individual freedom without mutual obligation. The political contest descended into the 
culture wars, fuelling the flames of tribalism and polarization on which the hyper-liberal elites and 
the anti-liberal insurgents are now thriving. The concern of the political with forming character was 
lost through a slide into moralism and a politics of the unencumbered self. Thus liberals on left and 
right have celebrated the diversity of difference at the expense of civic ties that bind people together 
beyond the divides of class, color, creed, age, wealth, or gender. The loss of a shared national 
identity and mutual obligations undermined social cohesion and civic patriotism. As Mark Lilla has 
argued, Òin recent years American liberalism has slipped into a kind of moral panic about racial, 
                                                        
24 C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: Clarendon, 1962). 
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gender and sexual identity that has distorted liberalismÕs message and prevented it from becoming a 
unifying force capable of governing.Ó25 
 
Already in the 1970s, Christopher Lasch argued that liberalism was becoming increasingly 
associated with a move away from the family and mutual obligation towards a culture of narcissistic 
self-absorption and political retreat into the private sphere of subjective self-expression.26 The 
1980s, far from witnessing a revival of civic spirit, saw the rise of yuppie greed and self-
gratification whose economic excesses were mirrored in their social transgressions. A bunch of 
weed-smoking hippies morphed progressively into a generation of middle-aged, cocaine-fuelled 
financial speculators. The rise of global finance, driven by legislative and regulatory incentives to 
greed, has divided society and subordinated national interest to multinationals. 
 
Today liberals patronize or simply ignore those who neither support economic-cultural liberalism 
nor benefit from its effects Ð remember Hillary ClintonÕs jibe about half of TrumpÕs supporters as a 
Ôbasket of deplorables.Õ For them as for other voters, free trade, mass immigration, and 
cosmopolitan multiculturalism have meant greater economic hardship and unnerving cultural 
comprises. Identity liberalism entrenches a sectarian, minority politics at a time of polarization. The 
commentator Ross Douthat goes further than Lilla to suggest that 
people have a desire for solidarity that cosmopolitanism does not satisfy, immaterial 
interests that redistribution cannot meet, a yearning for the sacred that secularism cannot 
answer [É]. A deeper vision than mere liberalism is still required Ð something like "for 
God and home and country," as reactionary as that phrase may sound. It is reactionary, 
but then it is precisely older, foundational things that todayÕs liberalism has lost. Until it 
finds them again, it will face tribalism within its coalition and Trumpism from without, 
and it will struggle to tame either.27 
 
                                                        
25  Mark Lilla, ÔThe End of Identity Liberalism,Õ New York Times, 18 November 2016, available online at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/opinion/sunday/the-end-of-identity-liberalism.html?_r=0, expanded as The Once 
and Future Liberal. After Identity Politics (New York: HarperCollins, 2017). 
26 See Christopher Lasch, The Agony of the American Left (New York: Knopf, 1969); Haven in a Heartless World. The 
Family Besieged (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1977); The Culture of Narcissism. American Life in An Age of 
Diminishing Expectations (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1979). 
27  Ross Douthat, ÔThe Crisis for Liberalism,Õ New York Times, 19 November 2016, online at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/opinion/sunday/the-crisis-for-liberalism.html (original italics). 
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Liberalism is no longer hegemonic but it remains the default position of (former) mainstream 
politics, which no longer commands majority support because the adoption of social-cultural and 
economic liberalism has undone post-war coalitions between working-class and middle-class 
people. The ruling elites have lost or are on the back foot but they donÕt get it. For economic 
liberals, the non-metropolitan areas are uncompetitive, inefficient, and in need of Ômarket 
correction.Õ Meanwhile for social liberals, working-class cultures cling to a past long gone and 
backward values that will be swept away by a bright new cosmopolitan future. Neither on the 
ground of economic interest nor of social identity could left and right liberals find any reason to 
defend the working class and lower middle class people who are rejecting the status quo.28 The 
popular revolt against liberal elites opens up a space in which a Ôwar of positionÕ is fought between 
the ideology of hyper-liberalism that is ruling but no longer leading and its rivals Ð starting with the 




Across Western countries and beyond, a new movement of nationalist traditionalism is challenging 
rightwing liberalism whose origins go back to the New Right of Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, 
and their joint intellectual mentor Friedrich von Hayek. Part of the contemporary conjuncture is a 
surge in support for the radical right that opposes the New RightÕs global market fundamentalism. 
Tory arch-Brexiteers, Trump, EuropeÕs far right, and strongmen from Vladimir Putin via Recep 
Erdogan, Nahendra Modi to Xi Jinping are the political expression of nationalist traditionalism, and 
figures such as Steve Bannon and Alexander Dugin its theorists. 
 
This movement combines economic nationalism (ÔAmerica FirstÕ) with an appeal to traditionalist 
values, which is diametrically opposed to the New RightÕs fusion of economic globalism with social 
conservatism. But neither is conservative because both rest on certain libertarian ideas and deploy 
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revolutionary means to achieve their ambition of hegemony. The New RightÕs embrace of the 
unfettered global free-market as the main mode of social organization undermined community 
cohesion and the family that it professed to uphold. Nationalist traditionalismÕs state capture to 
smash the establishment has strengthened the Ôbig governmentÕ that it promised to abolish. Neither 
ideology is conservative because both have entrenched the power of corporate money in politics and 
consolidated the oligarchic hold over democracy. 
 
Nationalist traditionalism is a more accurate characterization of the rightwing insurgency than 
ÔauthoritarianismÕ or ÔpopulismÕ because the latter two denote a set of methods and tactics that are 
deployed just as much by movements on the hard left Ð including Syriza, Podemos, the militant 
group Momentum around the UK Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn, as well as the late Hugo Chvez 
and Nicols Maduro in Venezuela. Nationalism is not limited to the right either, but the difference 
with the revolutionary left is the radical rightÕs intellectual debt to the Traditionalist Movement.29 
Its main pioneer was Ren Gunon (1886-1951), a French philosopher who was raised a Roman 
Catholic, joined the Freemasons, and in later life converted to Sufi Islam. His legacy has influenced 
both Bannon and Dugin, in particular the idea that certain ancient faiths Ð such as medieval 
Catholicism, eastern Orthodoxy, Sufism, and the Hindu Vedanta Ð are repositories of shared 
spiritual truths, revealed to humankind at the dawn of civilization, which are being destroyed by the 
secular modern West.30 For Gunon, the path to liberation passes through the conversion of small 
elite groups who act as the vanguard of a spiritual revolution that is necessary for the success of a 
political revolt against liberal modernity.  
 
GunonÕs followers include Julius Evola, an Italian intellectual whose racial theories influenced 
interwar Fascism. Like Gunon, Evola denounced the spiritual emptiness of liberal modernity but 
unlike Gunon who emphasized the importance of proper spiritual conversion, Evola promoted a 
                                                        
29 Mark Sedgwick, Against the Modern World: Traditionalism and the Secret Intellectual History of the Twentieth 
Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
30 Ren Gunon, La crise du monde moderne (Paris: Gallimard, 1946), trans. The Crisis of the Modern World, tr. Marco 
Pallis et al. (Hillsdale: Sophia Perennis, 2001). 
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form of religious racism aimed at inciting popular uprisings wherever possible.31 Gunon and Evola 
were also cited by Donald TrumpÕs former strategist Steve Bannon in a widely referenced talk at a 
2014 Vatican-based conference hosted by the Human Dignity Institute on ÔPoverty and the 
Common Good: Putting the 'Preferential Option for the Poor' at the Service of Human Dignity.Õ 
While distancing himself from the white supremacism of Richard Spencer and other Ôalt-rightÕ 
figures inspired by Evola, Bannon nonetheless shares EvolaÕs belief in political change without 
waiting for a spiritual transformation. This outlook underpins BannonÕs praise for what he called Òa 
global tea-party movement [É] a center-right populist movement of the middle class, the working 
men and women in the world who are just tired of being dictated to by what we [Breitbart] call the 
party of Davos.Ó32 
 
Both before and since being sacked by Trump and then Breitbart, Bannon has been dismissed as an 
apologist of nationalism and nativism. Derided as a self-styled kingmaker who claims to have 
single-handled injected the Ôalt-rightÕ into the American political mainstream, Bannon is blamed for 
using Trump, whom he viewed as a Òblunt instrument,Ó to inflame cultural and racial tensions Ð as 
in the case of the PresidentÕs defense of far-right counter-protesters against the Ôalt-leftÕ attack on 
Confederate statues in Virginia and TrumpÕs endorsement of the Alabama senate candidate Roy 
Moore. But while Bannon advocates a politics that is unashamedly anti-globalist and nationalist, the 
intellectual foundations of his version of traditionalism go much further to include a critique of 
secularization, Islamic fascism, and capitalism. Binding them together is BannonÕs argument that 
the West has abandoned and even destroyed its Òunderlying spiritual and moral foundations of 
Christianity and, really, Judeo-Christian belief.Ó33 
 
What is striking is that, for the first time since the RepublicansÕ embrace of market fundamentalism 
under Nixon and Reagan, the capitalist system based on globalization and free trade is seen by the 
                                                        
31 Julius Evola, Revolt Against the Modern World, tr. Guido Stucco (Rochester: Inner Traditions, 1995). 
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US President and his (now former) chief counsel as a threat to prosperity. Whatever his intellectual 
deficiencies and flawed character, Trump grasped a truth that American and wider Western political 
class ignored for so long Ð a broken economy that produces AmericaÕs Ôforgotten men and womenÕ 
and an establishment that despises their ways of life. And whatever his apocalyptic outlook, Bannon 
has a coherent critique of contemporary capitalism as a force of dispossession. He rejects not just 
the crony capitalism of statist systems such as China or Russia where the kleptocratic elite enriches 
itself but also what he terms Òthe Ayn Rand or the Objectivist School of libertarian capitalism. [É] 
that form of capitalism is quite different to what I call the "enlightened capitalism" of the Judeo-
Christian West. It is a capitalism that really looks to make people commodities, and to objectify 
people [É].Ó34 
 
If nationalist traditionalism resonates with voters, it is because the liberal mainstream has failed to 
recognize the fundamental grievances that are shared by both working-class and lower middle-class 
voters: liberal-cosmopolitan globalization; the loss of manufacturing and industry; corrupt and 
incompetent elites; rising inequality of wealth, power, and social status; uncontrolled mass 
immigration; and the erosion of national sovereignty and identity. Unlike the Republican 
establishment and his Democrats opponents, Trump understood that many millions of Americans 
rejected the continuation of the liberal status quo. 
 
But far from offering the leadership required to usher in a new hegemonic settlement, the Trump 
Administration is an exercise in confused ambiguity. It promised the biggest infrastructure 
investment since the New Deal and an end to job-exporting trade deals, but in reality enacts 
protectionist borders to have more Ôneoliberalism in one countryÕ that serves the interests of the 
financial oligarchy on Wall Street and the billionaires in Silicon Valley and Hollywood. It professed 
to help ÔAmericaÕs forgotten men and women,Õ but in fact has pitted the white working-class against 
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fellow workers in the public sector and service as well as against socially conservative immigrants 
of color. 
 
Holding together a divided and chaotic White House is the one constant in TrumpÕs (very New 
Left) Ôpersonal politicsÕ Ð a penchant for plutocratic power. The dismissal of Bannon from the 
White House and then Breitbart News was at the instigation of the Mercer family who co-owns 
Breitbart and belongs to the US oligarchy. It is the main beneficiary of the tax cuts and controls 
TrumpÕs economic policy. Both his Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and his former chief 
economic adviser Gary Cohn are ex-Goldman Sachs who never stopped working for investment 
banks, and they tempered BannonÕs economic nationalism, preventing so far a large-scale trade war 
with China that would hurt business more than workers. Under Trump, AmericaÕs oligarchical 
democracy looks set to continue on an increasingly anti-liberal trajectory Ð fusing economic 
libertarianism that dismantles social and environmental protections with militarism and 
manipulative propaganda that purports to reflect the Ôwill of the manyÕ while handing the levers to 
the plutocratic few. 
 
Elsewhere in the West, the new radical right combines nationalist traditionalism with elements of 
social progressivism in ways that are intellectually incoherent but electorally appealing. Movements 
such as Pegida in Germany, the Golden Dawn in Greece, Jobbik in Hungary, and Bloc/òsvit in the 
Czech Republic purport to represent the downtrodden people against corrupt elites that have lost 
touch with their citizens. Such movements favor economic intervention to shield populations from 
the worst effects of globalization, free trade, and transnational capitalism on workersÕ rights, wages, 
and living standards. They also claim to defend free speech and progressive policies such as support 
for feminism and gay rights. Much of this is driven by their desire to protect national and European 
culture from the impact of mass immigration and what they view as the creeping Islamization of the 
West. While some leaders of these groups try to draw a distinction between the supposedly fascist 
ideology of Islam and ordinary Muslims, the claim that Islam is incompatible with the West goes 
  19 
against the anti-fascist principle of religious liberty, freedom of conscience and the commitment to 
free speech regardless of class, color or creed. 
 
Compared with neo-Nazi and neo-fascist movements of the past, the new radical right has been 
more influential by injecting ideas into the mainstream and thereby shifting the political discourse 
to the point where some of their values have become the new norm. Part of the problem in 
confronting such movements is the liberal establishment tendency to vilify their supporters. As 
Jamie Bartlett remarks, ÒitÕs lazy and simplistic to call Pegida supporters racist ill-informed bigots. 
The people who do so not only misunderstand them; they risk making the problem worse, because it 
provides them with the ammunition that the liberal elites are trying to silence them.Ó35 Crucially, 
Bartlett notes that new movements and their ability to mobilize people offer some form of common 
purpose and even belonging absent from mainstream professional politics Ð replacing Òthe empty 
consumerism, the crap precarious jobs, the fragmented communities. In a strange way, they are a 
form of the Ôidentity politicsÕ they claim to dislike to much.Ó36 Hyper-liberalism is exacerbating the 
worst aspects of nationalist traditionalism Ð including a mix of libertarians, Ôalt-righters,Õ and far-
right white supremacists Ð because it reinforces popular distrust in mainstream media and 
politicians who are widely perceived to ignore concerns about the levels of immigration and the loss 




The other ideology that is challenging the liberal right is one-nation conservatism. Originally 
developed by Edmund Burke and Benjamin Disraeli, it is being renewed by figures such as Roger 
Scruton, Jesse Norman MP, and Nick Timothy who is the former chief of staff to the British Prime 
Minister Theresa May. She has distanced herself from Margaret ThatcherÕs economic liberalism 
and David CameronÕs social liberalism in an attempt to restore a more traditional Toryism that 
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combines greater economic justice with more social solidarity. Inspired by Timothy and other one-
nation conservatives such as George Freeman MP, MayÕs speeches proclaim that Òwe [the 
Conservatives] donÕt just believe in markets, but in communities. We donÕt just believe in 
individualism, but in society,Ó while also emphasizing the importance of Òthe bonds of family, 
community, citizenshipÓ and the crucial role of government to Ònurture those relationships, 
networks and institutionsÓ that make a Òshared societyÓ work.37 
 
MayÕs words have not translated into any transformative action that is even less likely after losing 
her parliamentary majority in the June 2017 election and failing to formulate a clear position on 
Brexit. However, contemporary one-nation conservatism reflects a renewed Burkean vision that 
seeks Òto reject the ideological templates provided by the socialist left and the libertarian right and 
to embrace a new centre-ground in which government steps up Ð and not back Ð to act on behalf of 
us all.Ó38 
 
What is perhaps most striking is the critique of economic liberalism. MayÕs attack on financial elites 
and tax-dodging multinationals, her promise to tackle the pay gap between managers and 
employees, her embrace of industrial policy, and her championing of some workersÕ representation 
on company boards represents potentially a decisive break with four decades of market 
fundamentalism. Against the seemingly inevitable forward march of globalization and the triumph 
of market selfishness over shared prosperity, she wants to deploy an active state and legal system to 
help shape an economy at the service of society: ÒWe donÕt hate the state, we value the role that 
only the state can play,Ó and ÒitÕs time to [É] employ the power of government for the good of the 
people.Ó39 In a renewal of the Conservative commitment to subsidiarity, she favors stronger local 
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and regional self-government (here echoing the radical Tory legacy of Joseph ChamberlainÕs 
Ômunicipal socialismÕ promoted by Timothy) and also a strategic role for central government to 
invest in housing, research and development, and high-tech manufacturing. 
 
Until she lost her majority and authority, MayÕs aim was to replace ThatcherÕs and OsborneÕs 
trickle-down economics with a form of distributism by raising wages and sharing assets Ð not old-
style top-down redistribution through tax-and-spend. With proper organization and leadership, she 
could have been the first Conservative leader in nearly forty years to reject GladstoneÕs ÔWhig 
conservatismÕ with its emphasis on the unfettered market and self-help in favor of an updated 
version of ÔHigh ToryismÕ with its focus on national unity, mutual assistance, unconditional support 
of the truly needy and a measure of protectionism. 
 
However, one-nation conservatism is in an impasse over championing global free trade while also 
trying to build a more social market at home. Unrestricted free trade on the global market without 
regional tariff agreements is likely to hurt the very workers that one-nation conservatives claim to 
defend when, like May, they speak of an Ôeconomy for the many, not the privileged few.Õ Workers 
may be appeased by promised restrictions on immigration, but may become less so when these 
restrictions fail to materialize (more free trade with the rest of the world will lead to more economic 
migrants from abroad) and living standards continue to stagnate. Moreover, a likely desperate 
recourse to the most uninhibited global exponents of financial and business practice could prove 
incompatible with the forging of a domestic social market. Nor, given the nature of globalization, is 
it easy to achieve this in one country acting alone. 
 
And on the other hand, while there is a role for selective and temporary state protection for certain 
sectors, it is worth remembering that protectionism, in understandable reaction to the unequal 
predations of Ôfree trade,Õ has almost always reinforced inter-state conflict. It also fails to match the 
operation of capital at the global level where more targeted political cooperation is needed to 
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encourage a model of globalization which works for all. Regional organizations, such as ASEAN, 
Mercosur, or the EU Ð which establish privileged trade access under agreed rules between a group 
of nations Ð offer precisely the Ôthird wayÕ between free-trade and protection that tends to promote 
international pacification. 
 
Meanwhile, one-nation conservative ideas for domestic renewal are not consistent. Although rightly 
motivated by a desire to give better opportunities to children from low-income families, the 
commitment to ever-more social mobility is too limited an ideal. It needs to be supplemented by a 
recognition that most people will not prove clear Ôwinners.Õ A problem with mere meritocracy, as 
the Brexit vote and the election of Trump suggest, is that it breeds a dangerous resentment amongst 
the many who carry out necessary but unglamorous tasks, and remain valuably rooted in one place. 
These people also deserve adequate, comfortable provision and a sense of dignity and respect 
consequent upon appreciation for their service. 
 
A more genuinely Burkean perspective beyond liberalism would involve a search for a restored 
sense of belonging for all, for more holistic fulfillment in work (in resistance to the creeping 
proletarianization of labor) and for the combining of work with the needs of family and community. 
This idea of a balance of interests at the service of the common good also points the way to a more 
ethical economy. Instead of offering mere compensation for the side-effects of globalization, a true 
one-nation conservative approach has to focus on injecting social purpose into economic profit. 
 
The point is to provide fundamental reforms, which would begin to change the nature of the market 
itself by aligning the executive with the long-term interests of the company, its shareholders, 
employers, consumers, and communities where businesses operate. This would go beyond mere 
representation of workers on company boards, which is nevertheless important and welcome. 
Virtuous entrepreneurship, if undertaken with integrity and not just for instrumental purpose, can 
help increase profit and remuneration because it promotes innovation and productivity through 
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employee retention, job satisfaction, and participation in the workplace.  
 
One-nation conservatism can only hope to defeat the liberal New Right and nationalist 
traditionalism if it fights a Ôwar of positionÕ in which it reflects the common sense of the people 
who are far more Burkean in their practice of social virtues Ð such as generosity, loyalty, trust, and 
honor Ð than much of the political class. The Conservative MP Jesse Norman has articulated what 
such a Burkean revival of contemporary conservative thinking could look like. 40 He draws on 
BurkeÕs Òdeep philosophical critique of political rationalism and revolutionary ideologyÓ in order to 
develop a conservative politics that is committed to conserving a countryÕs main institutions and 
traditions, including liberty and the common good. For Norman, one-nation conservatism has to 
reject both the liberal idea of the atomized self and the collectivist Ôwill of the massesÕ so beloved of 
ideological vanguards like nationalist traditionalism.  
 
In accordance with BurkeÕs search for a radical yet traditional middle path, NormanÕs conservative 
politics is about instilling virtue and leading by example. That would involve upholding social order 
and parliamentary democracy in the national interest, balancing rights with obligations, renewing 
trust and cooperation, rebuilding institutional character, replacing crony capitalism with a socially 
embedded market economy, as well as devolving central state power to localities and communities. 
The test of one-nation conservatism will be whether it can truly avoid either liberal economism or 
liberal statism by forging such a social market. As with nationalist traditionalism, either a purely 
buccaneering approach to globalization or a xenophobic soft-fascism at home would be likely to 
ensure a backsliding in either respective direction. 
 
Tech utopianism (and retro leftism) 
 
A very different challenge to the domination of hyper-liberalism comes from the far left side of the 
political spectrum in the form of tech utopianism, which builds partly on accelerationist ideas and 
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partly on a retro leftist vision associated with 1970s statism. This is true of the Labour leadership 
around Jeremy Corbyn in the UK, SpainÕs Podemos, and GreeceÕs Syriza, and in a different sense 
Bernie Sanders in the USA. Tech utopian politics has its roots in the second phase of the New Left 
with a focus on a rationalist-scientific Marxism pioneered by Louis Althusser and Perry Anderson.41 
At the hands of post-capitalists such as Paul Mason, real Marxism Ð contained in a two-page section 
of MarxÕ Grundrisse, entitled ÔThe Fragment on MachinesÕ Ð turns out to be all about technological 
innovation, not market laws modeled on laws of nature. Economic cycles are not primarily 
governed by boom and bust linked to the iron law of unstable but ultimately balancing supply and 
demand. Rather, the economy evolves according to waves of innovation in finance and technology 
that incubate revolutionary change.  
 
Driving this process is social knowledge, which replaces the social relations of labor production as 
the main dynamic of capitalism and with it the worker as the revolutionary subject. The Blue 
Labour thinker Jonathan Rutherford summarizes the position of the revolutionary left well: 
The future of society belongs to a higher educated caste of information workers. Their 
taxes will pay for a universal basic income to support a redundant, workless working 
class. History will move rapidly toward human perfection by computer power and the 
mastery of the new historical subject. The totalitarian implications can be overlooked.42 
 
The other roots of tech utopianism go back to a further shift in the Marxist tradition to the 
operaismo movement in Italy in the 1950s and 1960s, which combined a critique of centralized 
Marxism-Leninism with an alternative focused on direct worker action rather than the battles of 
representative democracy and the collective action of parties or trade unions. Like the New LeftÕs 
shift away from work and workers, operaismo has morphed into the post-operaismo of Hardt and 
NegriÕs multitude Ð a global network of militant movements spanning anti-globalization groups, 
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anti-war mobilization, Occupy, on-campus agitation, and now the protest politics of Syriza, 
Podemos, and Momentum.43 
 
Common to post-operaismo and accelerationist post-capitalism is the belief in a future economy 
without work or workers driven by a process of technological de-materialization that replaces the 
physical world of manufacturing and industry with the virtual reality of knowledge, information, 
and other intangible assets. It also replaces the political economy of land, labor, and capital with a 
new knowledge economy of networks, leisure, and transferable skills. As the old workers become 
the new self-employed entrepreneurs (or, alternatively, the lazy leisure class), the wage-labor 
conflict at the heart of capitalism withers away and with it the class system. 
 
If this sounds eerily like the social-democratic liberalism of Clinton and Blair, it is because Ð as 
both Cruddas and Rutherford point out Ð tech utopians agree with social-democrat liberals that the 
future of the left lies in a shift away from the working-class and the labor interest towards the 
middle-class urban salariat and the globalized, networked youth. They also share a retreat behind 
variants of neo-classical economics, which is a simplified version of Hayek and Keynes 
respectively. Whereas Ôthird-wayÕ liberals in the 1990s privatized, deregulated, liberalized, and re-
distributed some small proceeds from corporate capitalism, the tech utopians harken back to the 
1970s in their desire to tax the tech giants, borrow billions for centralized bureaucracy, and 
nationalize vast swaths of industry. Underpinning their shared neo-classical economics is a 
utilitarian and deontological model of justice. Both view just social relations in terms of utility-
maximization and rights-based welfare. Concretely, they combine GDP growth, which is seen as the 
best means to achieve Ôthe greatest happiness of the great numbers,Õ with the provision of individual 
entitlements that are disconnected from contribution and increasingly rationalized by the managerial 
state. Social-democratic liberalism is a model of Kantian ethics of context-less duties with Millian 
liberty and Weberian rationalist statecraft. For its part, tech utopianism fuses Benthamite calculus 
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with a heavy dose of Fabian centralism and a Trotskyst embrace of Ôpermanent revolutionÕ against 
the working-class. 
 
Crucially, neither social-democratic liberalism nor tech utopianism offer the left any prospect of 
intellectual renewal in the hope of replacing the hegemony of the liberal right or the nationalist-
traditionalist insurgency. The reason is that both fail to challenge the fundamental logic of 
contemporary capitalism Ð the cultural conditions as well as the economic workings that involve 
destruction and dispossession through the concentration of wealth and power as well as the 
commodification of everyday life. The capitalist economy destroys human attachment to, and 
affections for, relationships and institutions by re-embedding them in impersonal transactions. Such 
an economy abstracts people and production from value and treats everyone and everything as a 
commodity with a market price. 
 
The reason for this blindness about capitalism is that both ideologies are grounded in a philosophy 
of abstraction from our embodied humanity and from our embedding in nature. As Cruddas argues, 
social-democratic liberalism and tech utopianism rest on statism, rationalized welfare, technological 
determinism, hyper-individualism, abstract cosmopolitanism, a libertarian conception of freedom to 
opt out from work and citizenship, passive consumerism, a denial of agency, and an anti-humanism 
dressed up as techno-scientific enhancement.44 The organizational energy of new movement-parties 
and the charisma of their leaders cannot mask the unthinking orthodoxy that prevents an intellectual 
renaissance, which is necessary for a leftwing counter-hegemony. 
 
Here the lessons from Bernie SandersÕ politics provide some building blocks for a renewal of the 
left. First of all, he struck a chord with the disaffected working class precisely because he connected 
the fate of the Rust Belt factory workers to that of people in the public sector and the services 
industry, speaking of shared interests and values in ways that bound them to the struggling middle-
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class. Second, Sanders led a political insurgency that was positive, offering hope and transformative 
action to a broad coalition of working families: 45 pro-worker and pro-small business, promising 
criminal justice reform plus Medicare for all; better social care plus free college tuition. Third, his 
critique of AmericaÕs Ôrigged systemÕ was informed by a conception of justice that transcends 
individual freedoms-as-rights and collective utility in the direction of the common good. 
 
But much of this was under-developed and got lost in an acrimonious contest for the Democratic 
nomination, in which the Sanders campaign was arguably guilty of virtue-signaling its moral 
superiority and accusing the Clinton campaign of underhand tactics. In turn, the Clinton machine 
was guilty of virtue-signaling her experience and dismissing the Sanders candidacy as protest rather 
than a serious attempt to gain power and govern the country. So far Sanders and the Democrats 
have failed to articulate an alternative to ClintonÕs hyper-liberalism that not only replaces the global 
free-market with a moral economy but can also build a common good politics based on a balance 




With its roots in the traditions of Romantic philosophy, the guild and cooperative movement, as 
well as Christian social teaching, ethical socialism has the conceptual resources to develop a 
renewed public philosophy based on a moral critique of capitalism and the re-imagination of a just 
social order. Romanticism is central to such a project because it sought to chart an alternative 
modernity around nature, human creativity, and the imagination, which outflanks the binary divide 
between the rationalist and empiricist strands of the Enlightenment by binding reason to habit, 
feeling, and faith. Connected with this is a wider divide in philosophy since the seventeenth century 
between humanism and the modern scientific revolution and the concomitant separation of 
economics from moral philosophy Ð whose intellectual origins go back to the thirteenth and 
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fourteenth centuries, in particular the split between a metaphysics of participation and an ontology 
of immanence that ultimately underpins accelerationist anti-humanism.46 This fundamental division 
between an ethical and an economistic outlook runs through the history of socialism both before 
and after Marx. Culture and society, not state and market, are the main foundations on which ethical 
socialism builds a politics of the common good. 
 
One reason why Romantic philosophy is so important to the history of socialism is its traditional 
and radical character. English Romantics like Blake, Shelley and Coleridge, with their German 
contemporaries Novalis, Hlderlin, and Friedrich Schlegel, or their French counterparts Joseph 
Joubert, Chateaubriand, Maine de Biran, and the young Victor Hugo Ð for all their diverse modes of 
political radicalism Ð actually refused the impersonal ontology of immanence just as much as they 
refused the voluntarist politics of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. Instead, they combined a 
commitment to radical reform with a deep respect for tradition, notably the fusion of Greco-Roman 
philosophy with Christianity that bequeathed to us the dignity of the person, the ancient liberties, 
virtue, the common good, and citizenship.47 
 
Romanticism Ð especially in Germany with Novalis and Schlegel and in England with William 
Morris and John Ruskin Ð transmitted and developed the legacy of Burke. He rejected the despotism 
of the ancien rgime and the tyranny of the French Revolution in favor of a politics based on 
embodied covenantal relations, not abstract contractual ties, human association rather than 
individualism or collectivism, affection for the Ôlittle platoonsÕ and attachment to institutions 
instead of human being as carriers of historical laws or soulless economic agents. 
 
Far from being confined to the conservative tradition, Burkean thematics shape ethical socialism: 
the idea of local government that educates the citizenry to participate in the public realm; the idea of 
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parliamentary scrutiny of the government; the proportional participation of all classes of working 
people Ð not just property owners Ð in the affairs of the state; the right of the people to resistance as 
a last resort against unjustified tyranny; the idea of blending both authority and freedom by 
conceptualizing the latter not as a rational right of the individual but rather as a system of both 
duties and privileges; the need for a renewable aristocracy that admits to its rank outstanding 
citizens and can thus assume the responsible leadership of the state with a view to the common 
good; the political primacy of land ownership over the ownership of mobile goods (in particular 
paper money).  
 
BurkeÕs conception on virtue as Ôprincipled practiceÕ is of particular significance to ethical 
socialism because it charts a radical yet traditional middle ground beyond extremes. This middle 
ground not only echoes Aristotelian and Thomist virtue ethics but also extends it in a more 
democratic direction. Virtue is democratic because its practice is open to all, especially the supreme 
virtues of love, trust, hope, mercy, kindness, forgiveness, and reconciliation. It is also benignly non-
democratic because the practice of virtue requires guidance through time by the already virtuous, 
skilled, generous, and wise at every level of society from the plumber to the wing-commander. The 
transmission of virtue from generation to generation involves a legitimate place for hierarchy in 
terms of educative guidance, gradual initiation, and the conveying of tradition. Besides formal modes 
of representation, democracy in the Burkean sense requires more hierarchical leadership by 
honorable elites and greater popular participation.48  
 
Crucially, virtue as a Ôprincipled practiceÕ is not found in the innermost recesses of the human mind 
nor can it be inductively known from experience but rather is embedded in social relationships Ð the 
Ôcustoms, manners, and habits of lifeÕ that shape our everyday existence, which encompasses work, 
family, community, and country. These Burkean themes run through the ethical socialist politics of 
the common good, starting with Morris who redefines virtue: it ceases to be MachiavelliÕs military 
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prowess or the a-political moral virtue of Rousseau and Smith and instead becomes the principle by 
which we translate the ethics of love into practice. The virtue of charity, when applied to labor, 
elevates work into art: Òthe aim of art [is] to destroy the curse of labour by making work the 
pleasurable satisfaction of our impulse towards energy, and giving to that energy hope of producing 
something worth its exercise.Ó49 
 
MorrisÕ defense of the dignity of work was sparked by his moral outrage over the impact of the 
Industrial Revolution on the commodification of society, which he shared with Ruskin. The other 
major figure in the development of ethical socialism in the English-speaking world was R.H. 
Tawney and his distinction between two approaches: first, an economistic approach based on 
utility-maximization and the central administration of things, which are compatible with both state-
sponsored and market-driven capitalism; second, an ethical approach anchored in the practice of 
solidarity and self-government as a resistance against the commodification of life and dispossession 
of inheritance, as well as a pursuit to realize oneÕs vocation and talents Ð how to live a good life.50 
Such an outlook is diametrically opposed to accelerationist transhumanism that tries to transcend 
our embodied existence in a quest for alien immortality in outer space. 
 
Ethical socialism was until recently part of the social-democratic left and the labor movement. In 
the USA, it inspired both Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert Kennedy who were arguably the most 
visionary voices of the civil rights movement and the Democrats in the post-war era. Their politics 
sought to build a new coalition between the more liberal urban middle class and the more socially 
conservative small-town and rural working class51 Ð a coalition most recently mobilized by Bill 
Clinton and much less so by Barack Obama but in each case for predominantly electoral purposes. 
In Britain, a number of Labour Party leaders Ð including Keir Hardie, Ramsey MacDonald, and 
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George Lansbury Ð Òwere all driven by a profound sense of human fellowship forged alongside 
Morris in the 1880s.Ó52 Others, like LabourÕs first post-war Prime Minister Clement Attlee, adopted 
some principles of ethical socialist politics, including Ôparliamentary socialismÕ and a popular 
patriotism based on a sense of obligations and duties.53 The Ôconservative socialismÕ of Tawney, 
Morris, and Ruskin was also taken up by leading intellectuals such as E.P. Thompson and Raymond 
Williams, who developed left philosophy in a very different direction compared with the second 
phase of the New Left whose scientific Marxism laid the foundations for the materialist politics of 
social-democratic liberalism and the new tech utopianism. The same applies to both the non-statist 
guild socialism of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon who rejected scientific Marxist statism and the Catholic 
personalism of Emmanuel Mounier who resisted any accommodation with fascism.54 
 
Thus the question for the moderate left today is whether it has the intellectual hart-headedness and 
the political courage to renew the legacy of ethical socialism in the Ôwar of positionÕ with the 
nationalist traditionalists and tech utopians. Earlier moments of left revisionism have yielded little 
more than reheated orthodoxy combined with a tactical repositioning in order to appeal to different 
sections of the electorate. Faced with deeply divided societies and a polarized politics, the task for 
the moderate left is to develop what Jonathan Rutherford, echoing Gramsci, calls a patriotic 
socialism that is Ônational popular.Õ 
 
The unfolding Ôwar of positionÕ over humanism 
 
Today, the main political resistance to hyper-liberalism comes not from one-nation conservatism or 
ethical socialism but rather from nationalist traditionalism and tech utopianism. Both are in secret 
collusion. The Tory arch-Brexiteers and the Trump administration have turned to the state as the 
instrument of still faster and more complete deregulation. At the same time, a greater executive 
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capture of the state may permit a greater overriding of welfare and work protections which 
democratic opinion tends to resist. The marginalized masses can be bought off with militarism and 
protectionism, besides more extensive if more permanently degrading welfare provisions where 
absolutely necessary. Moreover, the state bailing out of the banks since 2008 means that a market-
state entirely subordinate to the interests of capital has now evolved into being also a state-market, 
for which government monopoly of both force and currency provision has become essential to the 
management of an economy permanently dependent on a negative cycle of debt. In this fashion, it 
could be that the Chinese hybrid of brutal market competition and tight state control is becoming 
normative rather than aberrant. 
 
Such an Ôultra-neoliberalÕ fusion already speaks competing anti-humanist languages. On the left, we 
are seeing a celebration of the further blurring of the boundaries between genders, between 
childhood and youth, between casual and committed, and between human, animal, and machine. All 
these blurrings will increase human danger and erode the civic institutions and relationships of 
affection and attachment on which we all daily rely. The current outcry over sexual harassment is 
surely a symptom of this, as is the popularity of Jordan Peterson. In response, the double hydra 
of state and market will assume ever-more control over processes of reproduction, production, 
leisure and an education whose humanist basis is being abandoned in favor of transhumanism. As 
Jamie Bartlett reports, transhumanists in politics pursue total morphological freedom, which they 
views an extension of the sexual freedom that we owe to the 1960s libertarian revolution.55 In this 
manner they confirm the thesis by the French novelist Michel Houellebecq that this revolution has 
left people atomized and increasingly incapable of forming lasting relationships, which fuels a 
desire for self-gratification that perpetuates this condition Ð a downward spiral of unfulfilled desire. 
 
On the right, we are witnessing a creeping integration of Ôalt-rightÕ themes. There is a pseudo-
scientific return of ÔraceÕ as a supposedly objective category, with an accompanying legitimation of 
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racial stereotyping and racial preference. An unabashed social Darwinism favoring neo-eugenics is 
also resurgent, as is a post-humanist accelerationism less constrained than that of the left, and happy 
to countenance the abandonment of humanity as we know it and any notions of ecological balance 
in favor of a fantasized cosmic reconstitution. 
 
Thus a double convergence has been at work in Western politics. For the past half-century, the 
liberal left and right converged around variants of individualism. Now the extremes are converging 
around variants of statism. Neither can be mapped onto the old opposition of left versus right 
because both view politics as oscillating between two other binary poles: the isolated individual 
with her rights and liberties, and the collective power of the state either to secure or override them. 
Jean Rohou has shown that, ever since Bodin and Hobbes, absolute state sovereignty and 
contracting between isolated individuals have been two halves of a modern politics seeking a purely 
formal, legal control over supposedly anarchic ÔnaturalÕ human forces.56 This ÔbiopoliticsÕ is a 
despairing refusal of the possibility of ancient and medieval civic self-government, which at its best 
involved a dispersal of rule throughout the social and economic order. 
 
For common to both statism and individualism is a denial of the paradoxically reciprocal hierarchies 
of social division that characterize Europe and other civilizations Ð intellectual/manual, 
aristocratic/popular, high culture/folk culture. This pattern of vertical reciprocity is precisely what 
the purely horizontal axis of hyper-liberalism and its main ideological challengers exclude. It 
collapses the hierarchical and mediatory axis of political culture into the horizontal false binary of 
(social-democratic or revolutionary) ÔleftÕ as the Ôrule of the manyÕ versus (conservative or radical) 
ÔrightÕ as the rule of a single strong power Ð state or market or both at once.  
 
Therefore the genuine alternative is a combination of virtuous and wise elites with greater popular 
participation in the polity and the economy, as well as a greater sense of mutual obligation and 
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hierarchy of honor, alongside much more real justice and creative freedom. The necessary 
involvement of all the people and of an integrating central force must be supplemented by the role 
of the intermediate Ôfew,Õ both in the sense of virtuous, wise elites at every level and of multiple 
associations operating between the level of state diktat and privately contracted choice.  
 
Such a paradoxical combination can be conceptualized as a public philosophy of the common good. 
In the economy, the common good signals a shift from market capitalism to economic justice and 
reciprocity. In society, it signals a shift from individualism to social solidarity and fraternal 
relations. And politically, it signals a shift from the minority politics of vested interests and 
balkanized group identity to a majority politics anchored in a balance of interests and a shared sense 
of belonging. Linking together common good economics and politics is an emphasis on the 
embedding of state and market in the intermediary institutions of civil society, which give people 
agency Ð professional associations, profit-sharing businesses, trade unions, universities, ecological 
groups, and devolved government. 
 
Therefore the alternative to tech utopianism and nationalist traditionalism is not social democracy 
or liberal conservatism, which history has now overtaken. It would rather be ethical socialism and 
one-nation conservatism, or even a fusion of both in a kind of Ôconservative socialismÕ Ð combining 
a more just and socially purposed market with more allowance for attachments to religion, custom 
and place than the left has been happy with since the 1960s. Such a mode of common good politics 
would remain committed to a traditional humanism, whose metaphysical undergirding now, it 
would seem, only religion and spiritually sensitive secular traditions provide. 
 
By contrast, an extended Trumpism would only transcend hyper-liberalism in a newly fascistic, 
anti-humanist and anti-traditional religion sense. Here it makes sense to invoke Michel 
HouellebecqÕs novel Soumission, which is less about the dangers of creeping Islamization and much 
more about the idea that no society, even post-Christian Europe, can survive without religion. As 
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one of the novelÕs characters remarks, without Christianity, the European nations are no more than 
bodies without souls Ð zombies. Tellingly, the novel ends by predicting that French society will get 
what it deserves, a state run by those who believe in something bigger than mere material wealth 
and cultural narcissism. 
 
The task is to build a new cross-class, cross-cultural and cross-national alliance that can appeal to 
people of all faiths and none around a politics based on work, family, place and cultural belonging. 
Common good politics can offer a radical middle with paradoxical combinations: a desire for fiscal 
discipline and greater economic justice; for further devolution of power to people and a more active 
role of government; for more global trade and a strategy for national renewal; for greater patriotism 
and a stronger international outlook. These paradoxical combinations are an indication that a 
politics of virtue and the common good can be popular and have majority support just because it 
reconciles the estranged interests Ð capital vs. labor, young vs. old, north vs. south, urban vs. rural, 
religious vs. secular Ð which hyper-liberals and their rivals view as diametrically opposed. 
 
The new pivot in politics 
 
We live in troubled times. A sense of anger and abandonment is spreading among people who feel 
humiliated, unable to live the lives they hope for, and powerless to shape the forces that dominate 
them and those they care about most. Among those forces are liberal and libertarian ideas of liberty 
as free choice and the pursuit of individual happiness. This is understood as including the right to 
terminate the lives of the older or the suffering. What is legitimated here is not a genuinely desirable 
democratic right but instead the will to power of some over others and essentially the strong over 
the weak. If the unique value of each human person is not upheld, then nothing prevents ending the 
lives of children and adults deemed to be too ill or too weak. This is social Darwinism under a new 
guise. Ironically, the science-based enlightened liberalism ends up on the same side as the 
Nietzschean will-to-power that liberals like Steven Pinker in his new book Enlightenment Now 
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associate with all the evils of modernity.57 Thus the humanist foundations of equality and dignity 
are once again under attack. 
 
Both libertarian and liberal thinking points towards a new form of biological totalitarianism based 
on a refusal of all value except the will of the individual. Neither the liberal centre nor the resurgent 
extremes have learned the lessons of Aldous HuxleyÕs warnings about totalitarian temptations in 
Brave New World. A control over reproduction is now more easily attained through self-release and 
promiscuity than self-discipline and fidelity. This allows the state to deal with the individual directly, 
rather than through the mediation of couples and families, which can offer more resistance to central 
intervention. Much of liberal feminism and minority rights activism too readily colludes with this 
underlying reality. These movements also embrace the commodification of human reproduction, 
which becomes a matter of contractual exchange Ð as with surrogacy. Precisely because such matters 
raise complex ethical questions, economic-social liberalism with its cult of pure individual rights or 
an outright denial of human dignity altogether is insufficient. Moreover, it is too rarely noticed that 
sexual permissiveness has today, as Huxley already noted in his dystopian novel, become a kind of 
opiate that covertly reconciles people to the loss of other freedoms Ð at the workplace, in the locality 
and beyond. 
 
This is not to overlook real social progress. Women and minorities are freer and have more rights and 
opportunities than before. All the discrimination that persists is a denial of human equality on which 
humanism rests. At the same time, greater personal autonomy coincides with a growing sense of 
peopleÕs powerlessness. Liberalism and libertarianism have liberated us from bonds of family, 
community and nation but the impersonal mechanisms of state and market that have replaced those 
interpersonal ties leave most of us at once free yet lacking in agency. The vision of humanity shared 
by liberals and libertarians offers freedom of choice, yet subordinates people to forces that cannot be 
governed democratically and that disregard dignity and human flourishing. Yet behind the isolated 
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individual stands the state. It can either give in to totalitarian temptations or, on the contrary, uphold 
principles that grant human existence a unique status. It can either promote death or choose life. The 
defence of humanism is the new pivot in politics. 
 
A common good politics is about nurturing a sense of fraternity, which in the West we inherited 
from the fusion of Greco-Roman philosophy with biblical revelation and which secular modernity 
has marginalized by unleashing the forces of dispossession that are capitalism, statism, liberalism, 
and globalization. Europe and the wider West will not survive and influence global affairs unless 
they renew their unique legacy and can find ways of instilling the practice of virtue in pursuit of the 
common good. 
 
